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APPENDIX 25- PENDING FEDERAL REFORMS

A comprehensive discussion of pending federal reform proposals as
of February I, 2000 is contained in PRELIMINARYREPORT# I: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE CURRENT LEGAL STRUCTURES GoVERNING THE PERFECTION AND
PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN lNTEILEcluAL PROPERTY AND AN
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REFORMS at section IV, pages 166-188.

APPENDIX 26- THE EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY UPON A FIRM USING PATENTS
AND TRADEMARKS AS COLLATERAL

by Lois R. Lupica
© Lois R. Lupica 200 I

INTRODUCTION

The Bankruptcy Code sets forth an orderly process for the
distribution of a debtor-in- bankruptcy's assets. This process has the effect
of altering many of the procedural and substantive rights and obligations of
the debtor, as well as of the debtor's creditors. Parties asserting a property
interest in assets of a debtor in bankruptcy, however, must rely on non
bankruptcy law to determine the nature and extent of their property
interests. The most commonly asserted interest by creditors involved in a
bankruptcy are security interests.
Security interests are consensual liens that arise at the inception of
a credit transaction. While security interests are enforceable between parties
to the credit transaction and as against third parties at the moment of their
creation, secured parties must "perfect" their interests for their interests to
Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. B.S.
1981, Cornell University; J.D. 1987, Boston University School of Law.
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survive a bankruptcy filing. The importance of tbe concept of perfection
of security interests in bankruptcy cannot be overstated. An unperfected
security interest can be avoided by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy for the
benefit of the bankruptcy estate. "Perfection for purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code means priority against the ordinary creditor witb a judicial
lien (the lien creditor).
The body of non-bankruptcy law most often implicated when
personal property is used as collateral is the state law captured in Article 9
of tbe Uniform Commercial Code(U.C.C.). Article 9 went through a major
revision in 1998. Both tbe "old" and "revised" versions of the Article
outline the rules for perfecting security interests in personal property
collateral, and define the priority rights held by secured parties. Primary
among tbe priority rights defined in Article 9 is tbe rule that a security
interest that is perfected by a proper state notice filing has priority over the
creditor with a competing lien (tbe lien creditor). The priority rule for lien
creditors is just one of many rules in Article 9 designed to provide clear and
certain rights to all parties in competition with security interests in all forms
of personal property. Intangible personal property falls within the broad
jurisdictional scope of Article 9.
The scope of Article 9, however, is not absolute. To the extent
that Article 9 is preempted by another body of fedeml law, the preempting
law governs tbe issue of how to establish a "perfected" security interest.
Both the Patent Act and the Lanham Act include recording and transfer
provisions. Both of these provisions protect subsequent purchasers against
unrecorded assignments. It does not appear from the face of either statute,
however, tbat the ordinary lien creditor qualifies as a protected purchaser.
The preemptive force of these statutes remains uncertain, however, because
some courts have defined tbe concept of protected transferee very broadly
when dealing witb federal recording provisions.
This uncertainty takes on greater urgency when tbe debtor, as owner
of tbe intellectual property, files for bankruptcy protection.' Bankruptcy
provides an acid test for the efficacy of non-bankruptcy law perfection of
security interests; unperfected security interests are subject to avoidance in
bankruptcy. The following sections outline the central effects of bankruptcy
upon a firm using patents and trademarks as collateral.

See btto;l/www.thestandard.com/articleldispla>(listing, in what is called the "Dot-com
Flop Tracker" internet companies that have failed).
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PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS

A.

Perfection Put to the Section 544(a) Avoiding Powers
Test

Non-bankruptcy legal regimes outline the methods for the transfer
of interests in patents and trademarks - namely the Patent Act' and the
Lanham Act.' Both of these federal statutes provides a method of
documenting and recording interests in intellectual property by the specific
property number assigned by the appropriate federal regulatory agency. A
structural element common to these statutes is their linkage of the concepts
of transfer and title.
Financiers seeking to take a security interest in most types of
personal property look to Article 9, which dissociates the concept of title
and security interest transfers and provides an efficient and streamlined
method of attachment and perfection of security interests. Article 9 states,
subject to certain specified exceptions, that it governs "any transaction
(regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in
personal property or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments,
general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts ...."' As comprehensive in
scope as Article 9 is, it also recognizes its potential for displacement, in
deference to the federal intellectual property regimes.' Both the Patent Act
and the Lanham Act address the issue of transfer of an interest in
intellectual property, but do not specifically mention, in the language of
Article 9, the issues of creation, attachment, perfection and priority of
security interests. Moreover, Article 9 simply provides that if another body
of law governs these matters, then Article 9 steps-back or is preempted.
Section 9-1 04(a) of old Article 9, known as the "step-back" provision reads:
This Article does not apply to a security interest subject to
Section 261 of the Patent Act states, "An assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void
as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, without
notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months
from its date or prior to the date of subsequent purchase or mortgage." 35 U.S. C. § 261
(1994).
Section I 060 of the Lanham Act reads in part: An assignment shall be void as against
any subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, unless it is
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months after the date thereof
or prior to such subsequent purchase. 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994).
4

u.c.c. § 9-102 (1996).
U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (1996).
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any statute of the United States to the extent that such
statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties
affected by transactions in particular types of property.'
Moreover, old section 9-302(3)(a) stares that an Article 9 filing "is
not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject
to "a statute . . . of the United States which provides for a national or
international registration ... or which specifies a place of filing different
from that specified in this Article."' The Official Comment to section 9
302(3)(a) states:
Subsection (3) exempts from the filing provisions of this
Article transactions as to which an adequate system of
filing, state or federal, has been set up outside this Article
and subsection (4) makes clear that when such a system
exists perfection of a relevant security interest can be had
only through compliance with that system (i.e., filing under
this Article is not a permissible alternative).'
Revised Article 9 also provides for the preemption of its provisions
by federal statute in sections 9-109(c)(l) and 9-3ll(a)(l).' It should be
noted that the new filing preemption language in section 9-31I(a)(l) does
not direct perfection or filing questions towards a statute of the United
States unless that statute contains a priority rule for lien creditors.
It is not apparent, however, from the text of either "old" or
"revised" Article 9 nor from the law addressing the title and transfer of
interests in patents and trademarks, exactly which legal regime governs the
attachment, perfection and determination of priority of security interests
in patents and trademarks. This is of concefi! because the issue of
perfection of security interests in patents and trademarks is at the heart of
many of the fundamental issues that arise in a debtor-with-intellectual
property's bankruptcy.
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, its trustee becomes interested
in determining whether any ·non-bankruptcy claimed rights (such as

•
7

Id.

u.c.c. §

9-302(3)(•) (1996).

U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a) (1996) cmt.
9

U.C.C. [Revised]§ 9-3II(a)(l).
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perfected security interests) are vulnerable to defeat." The trustee has the
power, under § 544(a) of the bankruptcy code, to upset the interests of an
unperfected creditor, thereby limiting the creditor's ability to receive the
full measure of what they are owed in the debtor's bankruptcy." As the
cases discussed below illustrate, perfection of security interests for § 544(a)
purposes is the most common context for the questions about perfection.
The issue of perfection of security interests also arises in the context of the
trustee's avoidance powers pursuantto section 547 (preferences) and section
548 (fraudulent conveyances). Preferences and fraudulent conveyances in
the context of transfers of interests of patents and trademarks will be
discussed in Part III.
(i) Perfection ofSecurity Interests in Patents

The Patent Act states that the "assignment, grant or conveyance"
of an interest in a patent "shall be void against any subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee" unless the assignment, grant or conveyance is recorded in the
PTO within three months from its date, or prior to the date of such
purchase or mortgage." While this provision is designed to address the issue
of the steps necessary to be taken to effectuate a transfer of interest in a
patent, it is not clear the extent to which this provision preempts Article
9 when the transferred interest at issue is security interest.
The court in In re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc.,"
addressed the question of whether the section 261 of the Patent Act
preempts Article 9 with respect to transfers of security interests in patents.
The court stated that the language in the Patent Act providing for the
recordation of an assignment speaks to the issue of a transfer of title and

"

The trustee ... may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation
incurred by the debtor that is voidable by 
(I) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the
case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all
property in which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial
lien, whether or not such a creditor exists; II U.S.C. § 544(a)(l)(l997).

II

Under Section 54l(a)(3), interests recovered under§ S50_become property of the estate.
Section 54l(a)(3) reads: (a) ... (The] estate is compnseo· of all of the following
property, wherever located and by whomever held: (3) Any interest in property that the
trustee recovers under section ... 550... of this title. II U.S.C. § 54l(a)(3) (1997).

"
"

35

u.s.c. § 261

(1994),

In re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635 (Banlcr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
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does not include within its meaning the transfer of a security interest. The
Transportation Design court concluded that only an Article Nine filing
protects the secured party with an interest in a recorded patent against the
bankruptcy trustee. The court did note in dicta, however, that recording
under section 261 of the Patent Act is necessary to protect the secured
party against subsequent assignees of the patent, including a secured party
that characterized its security interest as a "conditional assignment."
Following the lead of Transportation Design, the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel in In re Cybernetics Services, Inc., held that only an Article
9 filing was sufficient to perfect a security interest in a patent. In this case,
the debtor owned a patent for a video signal collection device. Creditor had
a security interest in all of debtor's assets, including "general intangibles"
and filed a financing statement to perfect its security interest in the Article
9 filing office. No financing statement filed or recordation of a transfer of
interest was made in the Patent office. Upon debtor's bankruptcy, creditor
moved for relief from the automatic stay in order to enforce its security
interest in the patent. The trustee opposed this motion and argued that the
creditor's security interest in the patents was unperfected and therefore
avoidable because the transfer of interest was not recorded in the Patent
office.
The BAP determined that to establish priority against involuntarily
lienholders, including the trustee in bankruptcy, the creditor must perfect its
interest pursuant to the terms of Article 9. A recording with the Patent and
Trademark Office is insufficient to provide constructive notice of a transfer
of a security interest. The court continued by observing that in defining
transfer of ownership, in contrast to the Copyright Act, the Patent Act does
not use words such as "mortgage" and "hypothecation" in addition to the
term "assignment.'" Accordingly, the Patent Act does not preempt Article
14

Section 101 of the Copyright Act reads: A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an
assignment, mortgage, exclusive licenses, or any other conveyance, alienation or
hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a
nonexclusive license. Section 205 (c) & (d) read: (c) Recordation as Constructive
Notice. - Recordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons
constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded document, but only if-(l) the
document, or material anached to it, specifically identifies the work to which it pertains
so that, after the document is indexed by the Register of Copyrights, it would be
revealed by a reasonable search under the title or registration number of the work; and
(2) registration has been made for the work. (d) Priority Between Conflicting Transfers.
- As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first prevails if it is recorded,
in the manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c), within one
month after its execution in the United States or within two months after its execution
outside the United States, or at any time before recordation in such manner of the later
transfer. Otherwise the later transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner, and if
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9 to the same extent that the Copyright Act does. The Patent Act
however, does provide priority rules for subsequent mortgages and
purchasers, and thus no such transfer is effective against such parties in the
absence of a recordation of the transfer in the PTO.
The case of City Bank and Trust Co. v. Octo Fabric, Inc·" offers an
illustration of the adverse consequences that can befall creditors who are
confused by the language of the Patent Act and its relationship to Article 9
and the Bankruptcy Code. In Otto Fabric, Creditor recorded a transfer of
an interest in debtors patents in the Patent Office within 90 days of debtor's
bankruptcy. It had also previously filed an Article 9 financing statement,
outside of the 90 day period. The bankruptcy trustee argued that the
security interest ought to be avoided as a preference since a recordation of
creditor's interest was made during the preference period. The bankruptcy
court held, in reliance on the comments to section 9-302 stating that "the
federal patent assignment statute occupies the field of filing." The
bankruptcy court concluded that the recordation of the security interest in
the Patent Office perfected secured creditor's interest, and because such
perfection was within 90 days of bankruptcy, the transfer was an avoidable
preference.1' The bankruptcy court also observed that a "single and absolute
system of securing a creditor's interest in patents as collateral" was
preferable, and this conclusion was supported by case law. 1' "Requiring both
federal and U.C.C. filing to perfect a creditor's interest in a patent would be
contrary" to the purpose of Article 9, which is to provide "a rational and
convenient filing system for security interests.''~'
·
The District Court disagreed with the bankruptcy court's findings
and conclusions citing several independent grounds. 1' First, the court
taken in good faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis ofa binding promise to
pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier transfer. 17 U.S.C. § § 101, 205 (c) & (d)

(1994).
IS

City Bank and Trust, Co. v. Otto Fabric, 83 B.R. 780, 781-82 (D. Kan. 1988).

16

In re Otto Fabric, Inc., 55 B.R. 654 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985).

n

The Bankruptcy Court cited in support of its conclusion that a patent may be assigned
as collateral for a loan Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 260 (1891); Magnuson
Industries, Inc. v. Co-Rect Products, Inc., 676 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1981); Railex
Corporation v. Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 119 (D. D.C. 1966). It further
observed that two circuits have noted that the patent as.signment statute "does not
require recording to support the validity of an assignment, except as to subsequent
purchasers or mortgagees without notice, and by implication recognizes the validity

as to all others." Citing, Why Corporation v. Super Ironer Corporation, 128 F.2d 539,
541 (6th Cir. 1942); John Tuman & Sons, Inc. v. Basse, 113 F2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1940).
In re Otto Fabric, Inc., 55 B.R. 654 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985).
I9

City Bank and Trust v. Otto Fabric, 83 B.R. 780.
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observed that the "federal statute does not expressly state that one must file
an assignment with the Patent and Trademark Office to perfect a security
interest. .. .If Congress intended to preempt the field of filing, it could have
said so."" Second, the language of Section 261 of the Patent Act says that
recordation in the Patent Office is necessary to protect againstthe interests
of a "subsequent purchaser or mortgagee" and makes no mention of lien
creditors. Thus, the court continued, the federal statute leaves open "a state
filing to protect one's security interest in a patent against a lien creditor.""
Finally, the court concluded, "to require a federal filing and thus a collateral
assignment to perfect a security interest in a patent seems inconsistent with
the modem notion that a grant of a security interest need not include the
conveyance of title or ownership rights.""
(ii) Perfection ofSecurity Interests in Trademarks

Similar to the Patent Act, the Lanham Act provides for the
recordation of assignments of trademarks, together with trademark holders'
goodwill. The Lanham Act, however, does not define the term
"assignment" and as is the case under the Patent Act, it fails to expressly
provide a system for perfecting security interests in trademarks. Because of
the absence of such a specific provision, courts have held that Article 9 of
the U.C.C. is the body of Jaw governing the issue of how one perfects a
security interest in a trademark -- while acknowledging that this subject
"involves a trap for the unwary.""
The court in In re Together Development Corp., in examining this
issue, looked at the historical antecedents to the term "security interest" in
order to determine whether an "assignment" would generally be thought of
as a security interest. The court observed that, in 1946, the year the
Lanham Act was passed, most security interests· were referred to as "chattel
mortgages" or "conditional sales." Prior to the enactment of Article 9 in
the early 1960's, most non-possessory pledges of interests in personal
property were called "mortgages" or "hypothecations." An assignment was
deemed to be a transfer of a different nature.
The court continued by examining the reference in the Lanham Act
20

Jd

"

/d.

22

Jd.

"

In re Together Development Corporation, 227 B.R. 439, 440-441 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1998).
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to phrase "successor to the business," concluding that Congress must have
had in mind "an outright assignment in the context of the sale of an entire
business of which the trademark is a part." Moreover, the court noted the
express reference in the Copyright Act to the transfer of "mortgages" and
concluded that the Lanham Act's language concerning the transfer of
interests fails to provided a method of perfecting security interests in
trademarks." Thus, the court concluded, Article 9 governs the issue of
perfection of security interests in trademarks.
This position is consistent with the progeny of cases that have
consistently held that the Patent Act does not preempt Article 9 and that
the Article filing office is the proper place to perfect a security interest in
trademarks. In Roman Cleanser v. National Acceptance Co.," the court
held that a security interest in a trademark is properly perfected by filing
under Article 9, and such a transfer of interest is not equivalent to an
assignment, which must be recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office. In
In re 199Z, Inc., the creditor recorded its interest in the PTO, as well as filed
an improper financing statement under Article 9." The court, in fmding
secured creditor's interest to be unperfected, held that the Lanham Act does
not preempt Article 9 because it does not expressly include provisions for
recording security interests within its scope."
B.

Characterization of Intellectual Property when used
as Collateral

Another concern central to the issue of the proper steps for
perfection of security interests is how to characterize specific types of
intellectual property for commercial law purposes. To illustrate, it is not
necessarily clear how to properly characterize computer software. A
prospective lender seeking to take a security interest in such software must
first determine whether this software is copyrightable, patentable or
protected as a trade secret, or characterized pursuant to Article 9, as
"intangibles," or "ordinary goods."" If a copyright has been registered
ld. at 441.
Roman Cleanser v. National Acceptance Co., 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986).

"

In re 199z, Inc., 137 B.R. 778 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992).
See id.

"

Moreover, if software is embodied in goods that are normally used in more than one
jurisdiction, the software, if deemed to be an Article 9 asset, may be deemed to be
"mobile goods." If the intellectual property embodied in the software is deemed to be
general intangibles, the secured party must file a financing statement in the state where
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describing, with specificity, the software, then the place to register and thus
perfect a security interest may be the Copyright Office. If however, a
business method patent has been registered with the Patent and Trademark
office, it may be deemed to be a general intangible, with the perfection
location dictated by Article 9."
The extent to which the software is determined to be copyrightable
or patentable in the first instance, as well as how one perfects a security
interest in an unregistered copyright, or in after acquired copyrights remains
unclear. The number of unanswered questions that are raised by this one
commercial scenario make the collateralization of many potentially
patentable materials an uncertain venture and accordingly, creditors
particularly vulnerable in bankruptcy.
AVOIDANCE OF SECURITY INTERESTS AS PREFERENCES AND FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES

A.

Preferential Transfers in Bankruptcy

Another important bankruptcy context for the confusion over
perfection is found in the area of preference law. The Bankruptcy Code
allows for the avoidance of certain preferential transfers made upon the eve
of bankruptcy. Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code requires a two-step
inquiry to determine whether a given transfer qualifies for preferential
avoidance. Section 547(b)" sets forth seven elements that must be
the debtor is located. Cases have held that software products are to be as "ordinary
goods,'' thus requiring a state law filing in the place where the "last event occurs on
which is based the assertion that the security interest is perfected or unperfected." It
should be noted that Revised Article 9 overrules the ~·software as ordinary goods" case
law and defines software as a general intangible. Financing statements with respect to
general intangibles are to filed in the place the debtor is located, which in the case of
an organized entity, is in its place of organization. See Revised U.C.C. § § 9-102(a)(42)
& (75), 9-307(b) & (e) (1999).

"

"

See U.C.C. § 9·103(3)(1997). Under revised Article 9 the place to file with respectto all
collateral is debtor's "location," which is defined for corporate debtors as its state of
organization. See Revised U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 307 (2000).

II U.S.C. § 547(b) reads: [T] trustee may avoid the transfer of an interest of the debtor
in property B
(I) to or for the benefit of creditor;

(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was
made;
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established to prove an avoidable preference. These elements include (i) a
transfer," (ii) of an interest in the debtor's property," (iii) to or for the
benefit of a creditor," (iv) for or on account of an antecedent debt," (v)
made while the debtor was insolvent," (vi) made on or within 90 days of
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made B
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such
creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and

(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if B
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provide.

"

Section 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code broadly defines transfer to include: ... every
mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including
retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of
redemption. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1997).
Accordingly, the perfection of security interests, title transfers, and payments to
creditors all fall within the definition of ''transfer" under the Bankruptcy Code ..

"
"

In order to be subject to preference avoidance, the transfer must be of property the
debtor.
Section lOI(IO)(A)of the Bankruptcy Code defines "creditor" as "an entity that has a
claim against the debtor that arose at the time ofor before the order for relief concerning
the debtor." II U.S.C. § !Ol(IO)(A) (1997). "Claim" is broadly defined as a "right to
payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured

or unsecured." !I U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) (1997). Because one of the stated justifications
for preference avoidance is to ensure equitable treatment among similarly situated

creditors, it follows that the transferee have the status of a creditor with a claim to
debtor's bankruptcy estate.
The Bankruptcy Code does not specifically define the term "antecedent debt." Cases
have determined that for a debt to be antecedent pursuant to§ 547, the transfer must
come after the date of the incurrence of the debt.

"

The classic definition of an insolvent debtor is one whose liabilities exceeds it assets.
Section § IOI(32) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "insolvent" as a "financial

condition such that the sum of the entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's
property, at fair valuation ...". II U.S.C. § 10I(32) (1997). The insolvency test is
applied on the date the transfer is made. If a debtor is solvent at the time of the transfer
in question, and later becomes insolvent and is insolvent at the time of bankruptcy, the
insolvency test is not met, and the transfer is not vulnerable to preferential avoidance.
The timing rules of Section 547(e) come into play in determining a debtor's solvency
at the time of transfer, because the date a transfer is made may be determined with

reference to the §547(e)(2)(B) grace period. Section 547(f) sets forth a presumption of
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bankruptcy" (vii) that enables such creditor to receive more than they would
receive under a chapter 7 distribution." If the trustee proves all seven
elements," the trustee has established its prima facie case for a preference,
and the transferee then has the burden of proving that one of the Section
547(c) exceptions applies." Section 547(c) describes eight different
insolvency during the 90 days preceding the bankruptcy filing. II U.S.C. § 547(1)
(1999). This provision's legislative history explains the impetus behind the enactment
of the presumption of insolvency during the 90 days prior to bankruptcy:

Given the state of most debtor's books and records, such a task is nearly impossible.
Given the financial condition of nearly all debtors in the three months before
bankruptcy, the task is also generally not worth the effort. Rarely is a debtor solvent
during the three

mon~hs

before bankruptcy. Thus, the preference section requires the

trustee prove a fact that nearly always exists yet never can be proven with certainty. ..
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1977).
The burden is placed on the creditor to rebut this presumption, which likely will
involve an examination of debtor's books and records and a valuation of its assets. In
the case of a challenge to a transfer made to or for the benefit of an insider beyond the
90 days prior to bankruptcy, the trustee is not granted the benefit of a presumption, and
must prove insolvency with reference to the debtor's records.
)6

Any transfer chal1enged as a preferencemust be made, if to a non-insider, within 90 days
prior to debtor's bankruptcy filing. Transfers are potentially avoidable if made within
one year of bankruptcy if the transferee is an "insider." "Insider" is defined under the
Bankruptcy Code to include, a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the
debtor, a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner, a general partner of the
debtor, or a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control.

If the debtor is a corporation, an insider is deemed to be a director of the debtor, an
officer ofthe debtor, a person in control of the debtor, a partnership in which the debtor
is a general partner, a general partner of the debtor, and a relative of a general partner,

director, officer, or person in control of the debtor. See II U.S.C. § 101(31) (1997).

"

The final focus of the preference analysis is "upon whether the creditor would have
received less than a 100% payout in a Chapter 7 liquidation." See Smith v. Creative

Financial Management, Inc. (In re Virginia-Carolina Financial Corp.), 954 F. 2d 193,
193 (4th Cir. 1992). This test requires a comparison between the value of what the
creditor received as a result of the transfer, and what the creditor would have received

in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation, absent the transfer. This is measured "not by
what the situation would have been if the debtor's assets had been liquidated and
distributed among his creditors at the time the alleged preferential payment was made,
but by the actual effect of the payment as determined by when bankruptcy results-" See

id, citing Palmer Clay Products v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227,229 (1936). lfthe value of what
was actually received is greater than the amount the creditor would have received in a

liquidation, the hypothetical liquidation test is satisfied.

"

In the case of a chapter II, a debtor in possession. "... a debtor in possession shall

have all the rights, other than the right to compensation under section 330 of this title,
and powers, and shall perfonn all the functions and duties . .. of a trustee serving in a

case under this chapter." See II U.S.C. § 1107 (1997).

"

Not all transfers made while the debtor is insolvent are deemed under the bankruptcy
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circumstances in which an otherwise avoidable preferential transfer is
granted a safe harbor from avoidance. These circumstances include (i) a
contemporaneous exchange for new value," (ii) a transfer in the ordinary
course of business," (iii) a transfer in connection with an enabling loan," (iv)
a transfer followed by a subsequent advance of new value," (v) transfer made
in connection with a floating lien," (vi) statutory lien transfers,'4 (vii)
transfers to satisfY domestic relations debts," and (viii) transfer made in
small consumer transactions." While each of the seven section 547(b)
elements must be present in order to find a preference, the transfer need
only qualifY under one of the section 547(c) safe harbors to be saved from
avoidance.
To aid the trustee in its pursuit of avoidance, Section 547(f) sets
forth a presumption of insolvency during the 90 days preceding the
bankruptcy filing; a presumption that may only be overcome by the
transferee's proof of sufficient evidence of solvency." Subsection 547(e)
outlines the governing rules that define when a transfer is deemed to be
made."
The time of the transfer relative to the time the debt was incurred
code to be preferential. Some transfers are deemed beneficial, notwithstanding the
bankruptcy process. See II U.S.C. § 547(c)(l)- (8) (1997) Section 547(g) reads: "For
purposes of this section, the trustee has the burden of proving the avoidability of a
transfer under subsection (b) of this section, and the creditor or party in interest against
whom recovery or avoidance is sought has the burden of proving the nonavoidability
of a transfer under subsection (c) of this section." See II U.S.C. § 547(g) (1997).

.,"

See II U.S.C.§ 547(c)(l) (1997) .

.,

See II U.S.C.§ 547(c)(3) (1997) .

See II U.S.C.§ 547(c)(2) (1997).

See II U.S.C.§ 547(c)(4) (1997).

44

See 11 U.S.C.§ 547(c)(5) (1997).

."
.
.

See 11 U.S.C.§ 547(c)(6) (1997) .
See 11 U.S. C.§ 547(c)(7) (1997).
See II U.S.C.§ 547(c)(8) (1997) .
This presumption only aids the trustee in cases where the transfer is made during the

90 days· before a bankruptcy filing. For transfers made to insiders more than 90 days
(but less than one year) before bankruptcy, the burden is the on trustee to prove
insolvency, in the absence of a presumption. See II U.S.C. § 547(f) (1997) .
See II U.S.C. § 547(e) (1997). In addition, § 547(a) provides the definition of
"inventory", "new value" and "receivable." See II U.S.C. §§§ 547(a)(l), (a)(2) & (a)(3)
(1997).
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is of critical importance to a preference analysis. When filing or
recordation is necessary to "perfect" the transferee's interest, Section
547(e)(2)(B) is implicated. Because of the requirement that the transfer
must be on account of an antecedent debt, the focus of the timing analysis
is on whether there is a "gap" between the incurrence of the debt and the
time of the transfer. The "antecedent debt" test is satisfied if the debt is
incurred before, or antecedent to the date the transfer."
Section 547(e)(2)(B) sets forth a ten day grace period within which
transfers of interests may be perfected. With respect to security interests,
this grace period begins on the date of attachment." If the transfer is
perfected within the grace period, the date of the attachment will be deemed
to be the date of the transfer." If, however, the transferee perfects its
interest beyond ten days from the date of attachment, the transfer is deemed
to take place on the date of perfection." If due to confusion and
uncertainty as to how to perfect a security interest in patents or trademarks,
the perfection is delayed beyond ten days from the date of the security
interest attachment, the transfer is deemed to be a transfer "on account of
an antecedent debt." If this happens within 90 days of a bankruptcy filing,
the transfer is a preference subject to avoidance under § 547(b)."
The case of City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric (discussed
above) provides a telling illustration of the trouble a creditor with an interest
in patents or trademarks may find itself in when its debtor files for
bankruptcy - even if it properly perfected its interest outside of the 90 day
preference period. While ultimately reversed by the District Court, the
bankruptcy court initially found that the recordation of a transfer of an
interest in a patent in the Patent Office within the 90 day preference period

"

The justifications for the preference rules support the necessity of the requirement of
transfers made on account of antecedent debt. If a debt is incurred contemporaneously
with a transfer, there is no depletion of value from the estate as a result of such transfer.
If creditors contribute value commensurate with their receipt of transfersof value, other
creditors are not subject to harm.

"

... A transfer is made ...(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor
and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time, ..
.11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1997).

"

If the section 547(e)(2)(A) grace period has not expired at the time bankruptcy is filed,
the transferee may perfect its interest within the three month grace period without

violating the automatic stay. See 1I U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (1997).

"
"

See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1997).
Notwithstanding the satisfaction of each ofthe section 547(b) elements of a preference,
the transfer could still be saved if it falls within one of the "safe harbor.. exceptions of

section 547(c). See II U.S.C. § 547(c) (1997).
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was a preferential transfer. It appears in this case that the secured creditor
was unsure as to the proper place to file to perfect its security interest, and
thought the prudent course was to take a "belt and suspenders" approach.
While not ultimately fatal to its interest in the collateral, it took two
written opinions to reach the ultimate conclusion that the proper place to
perfect a security interest in a patent is the Article 9 filing office.

B.

Transfers of License Interests as Preferences

As noted above, to qualify as a-preference, a transfer must be on
account of an antecedent debt. The date a debt is deemed to have been
incurred turns on a non-bankruptcy law determination. When intellectual
property is transferred as collateral or loan repayment or to otherwise
secure an obligation, the debt is deemed to arise once the obligation becomes
enforceable." Debts incurred in connection with absolute assignments of
intellectual property are deemed to arise at the time title or control is
transferred. When intellectual interests are licensed, However, the time the
debt is incurred is less straightforward.
If one looks at an intellectual property license as analogous to a real
estate lease, the debt would be deemed to have been incurred
contemporaneously with ea;ch periodic payment transfer. Accordingly, each
transfer of a license interest would be on account of a contemporaneous
debt.
·
An alternative view of a license for the use or exploitation of a
patent or trademark, however, has the potential to raise some troubling
preference issues. If the language of the license, or the context, suggests a
one-time transfer of rights in exchange for periodic payments, then the debt
would be deemed to have been incurredat the time the license agreement was
entered into. Thus, each license payment would be considered a transfer on
account of an antecedent debt. If a debtor files for bankruptcy during the
term of the license agreement, any payments made (on account of an
antecedent transfer of rights) within 90 days of bankruptcy are subject to
avoidance as preferences.

C.

Avoidance of Fraudulent Conveyances

Fraudulent conveyances are transfers prior to bankruptcy, made
with either actual fraud, or with what is known as constructive fraud. When

"

City Bank v. Otto Fabric, 83 B.R. 780,781-82 (D. Kan. 1988).
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a debtor is in bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee the power
to avoid transfers qualifying as fraudulent under two independent provisions.
Section 544(b) allows the trustee to avoid any transfer "by the debtor that
is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that
is allowable."" What this means is that any transfer that could be avoided
by a creditor under state fraudulent conveyance act can be avoided by the
trustee in bankruptcy." This provision allows the trustee to avoid transfers
made within the state-law "look-back" period-- which can be as long as four
years. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy gives the trustee powers to avoid
fraudulent transfers without requiring that there be an unsecured creditor
with an avoidable claim in bankruptcy." The section 548 "look-back"
period is one year.
Section 548 fraudulent conveyance law may be implicated when
patents and trademarks are used as collateral for reasons similar to those
discussed with respect to preferences. For there to be a fraudulent transfer,
there must be a transfer of an interest -- and the transfer of a security
interests qualify under this provision. If the security interest transfer is
perfected within the "look-back" period, the transfer, if meeting the criteria
for avoidance under section 548 or under state fraudulent conveyance law,
is subject to avoidance. If due to confusion and uncertainty as to how to
perfect a security interest in patents or trademarks, the perfection is delayed
and spills into the look-back period, the transfer is vulnerable to defeat by
the trustee as a fraudulent conveyance.

"

II U.S.C. § 544(b) (1997).
To use section 544(b), there must be a creditor with an allowable claim in debtor's
bankruptcy that could have avoided tbe transfer under state law.

"

Section 548(a)( I) reads: The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of tbe debtor
in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or
within one year before the date of tiling of the petition, if tbe debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily-(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to
hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the
date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or (B) (i)
received less than a reasonably equivalent in value in exchange for such transfer or
obligation and (ii) (I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such

obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(Il) was engaged in business or a transaction, o9r was about to engage in business or

a transaction. for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably
small capital; or (Ill) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts
that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured. II U.S.C. §
548(a) (1997).
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APPENDIX 27 - DEFINITIONS

Accessions 
Accounts-

Goods that are physically united with other goods in
such a manner that the identity of the original goods is
not lost. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)
A detailed statement of the mutual demands in the

nature of debit and credit between parties, arising out
of contracts or some fiduciary relation. Black's Law

Account debtor 
After-acquired 
Property clause

Assignment 

Dictionary 18 ( 6'" ed. 1990)
The person who is obligated on an account, chattel
paper or general intangible. U.C.C. § 9- 105(l)(a).
A clause in a mortgage providing that any property
acquired by the borrower after the date of the loan and
mortgage will automatically become additional
security for the loan. Black's Law Dictionary 61 (6'"
ed. 1990)

The act of transferring to another all or part of one's
property, interests, or rights. Black's Law Dictionary
119 (6'" ed. 1990)

Attachment 

When the three basic prerequisites of a security
interest exist (agreement, value, and collateral), the
security agreement becomes enforceable between the
parties and is said to "attach". Black's Law Dictionary
126 (6'" ed. 1990)

Bona fide
purchase rule 

When a legal title holder of a patent transfers his or

her title to a third party purchaser for value without
notice of an outstanding equitable claim or title, the

Chattel paper 

Commercial
Tort claimCondition
Precedent
Constructive - Notice

purchaser takes the entire ownership of the patent, free
of any prior equitable encumbrance. This report p. 121
A writing or writings which evidence both a monetary
obligation and a security interest in or a lease of
specific goods. Black's Law Dictionary 237 (6'" ed.
1990)

All business-related tort claims that do not involve
personal injury or death.
A condition which is to be performed before some
right
dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent
thereon is performed. Black's Law Dictionary 293 (6'"
ed. 1990)
Such notice as is implied or imputed by law, usually
on the basis that the information is a part of a public
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Derivative title 

DictaFinancing Statement 
Federal Intellectual
Property Securities
Act (FIPSA) 

General intangible 

GoodsInstrument -

Lanham ActLien creditor 

Mask works-

Perfection 
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record or file, as in the case of notice of documents
which have been recorded in the appsopriate registry
of deeds or probate. Black's Law Dictionary 314 (6"
ed. 1990)
The common-law principle, codified repeatedly in the
U.C.C., that a transferee of property acquires only the
transferor's rights therein. Black's Law Dictionary
444 (6" ed. 1990)
Opinions of a judge which do not embody the
resolution or determination of the specific case before
the court. Black's Law Dictionary 454 (6" ed. 1990)
A document setting out a secured party's security
interest in goods. Black's Law Dictionary 631 (6" ed.
1990)

A comprehensive package of amendments to the tract
recording provisions of the Copyright Act, the
Lanham Act, the Patent Act and the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act. This report p. 12
Any personal property (including things in action)
other than goods, accounts, contract rights, chattel
paper, documents, instruments, and money. Black's
Law Dictionary 684 (6"' ed. 1990)
A11 things that are moveable when a security interest
attaches. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)
A negotiable instrument or any other writing that
evidences a right to the payment of a monetary
obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease,
and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is
transferred by delivery with any necessary
endorsement or assignment. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)
Federal statute enacted in 1946 which revised federal
trademark law and registration process. Black's Law
Dictionary 880 (6"' ed. 1990)
One whose debt or claim is secured by a lien on
particular property, as distinguished from a ..general"
creditor, who has no such security. Black's Law
Dictionary 923 (6"' ed. 1990)
Tenn referring to the set of templates or "masks" that
together make up the design of a semiconductor chip.
The chip manufacturer uses these masks in a
photographic depositing and etching process to build
up the three-dimensional structure of the chip. This
report p.l5
In secured transactions law, the process whereby a
security interest is protected, as far as the law permits,
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Preemption Doctrine 

PriorityProceeds-

Purchase-money
security interest 

Security Interest-

Service-

SoftwareUniform Commercial Code-

603

against competing claims to the collateral, which
usually requires the secured party to give public notice
of the interest as by filing in a government office.
Black's Law Dictionary 1137 (6" eel. 1990)
Doctrine adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court holding
that certain matters are of such a national, as opposed
to local, character that federal laws preempt or take
precedence over state laws. Black's Law Dictionary
117 (6" eel. 1990)
In bankruptcy, refers to secured claims that by statute
receive more favorable treatment than other unsecured
claims. Black's Law Dictionary 1194 (6" eel. 1990)
The following property:
A) whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license,
exchange, or other disposition ofcollateral;
B) whatever is collected on, or distributed on
account of, collateral;
C) rights arising out of collateral;
D) to the extent of the value of collateral, claims
arising out of the loss, nonconformity, or
interference with the use of, defects or
infringement of rights in, or damage to, the
collateral; or
E) to the extent of the value of collateral and to the
extent payable to the debtor or the secured party,
insurance payable by reason of the loss or
nonconformity of , defects or infringement of
rights in, or damage to, the collateral. U.C.C. §9
102(a)

One which is taken or retained by seller of item to
secure its price or taken by person who advances
funds to enable one to acquire rights in collateral.
Black's Law Dictionary 1235 (6"' eel. 1990)
A form of interest in property which provides that the
property may be sold on default in order to satisfy the
obligation for which the security interest is given.
Black's Law Dictionary 1357 (6"' ed. 1990)
Duty or labor to be rendered by one person to another,
the former being bound to submit his will to the
direction and control of the latter. Black's Law
Dictionary 1368 (6"' ed. 1990)
A computer program and any supporting information
provided in connection with a transaction relating to
the program. This report p. 25
One of the Uniform Laws drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioner's on Uniformed State
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Valuable consideration 

Venture capital 
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Laws and the American Law Institute governing
commercial transactions. Black's Law Dictionary
1531 (6"' ed. 1990).
A class of consideration upon which a promise may be
founded, which entitles the promisee to enforce his
claim against an unwilling promisor. Black's Law
Dictionary 1550 (6"' ed. 1990)
Funding for new companies or others embarking on
new or turnaround ventures that entails some
investment risk but offers the potential for above
average future profits. Black's Law Dictionary 1556
(6"' ed. 1990)

